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Introduction 
 
 
Israel on the Road to the Orient? 
The Cultural and Political Rise of the Mizrahim 
Lidia Averbukh 
The Israeli debate sparked by the manslaughter trial of an IDF soldier over an incident 
in Hebron in March 2016 reveals an identity dimension as well as an ethical one. The per-
petrator – convicted of shooting a Palestinian assailant in the head when he was already 
lying motionless on the ground – was an “Oriental” Jew, a so-called Mizrahi, thus insert-
ing the event into the context of the internal conflict between Mizrahim and Ashkena-
zim, the Jews of European origin. In recent years the pendulum has swung towards the 
originally highly marginalised Mizrahim – who now assert political and cultural leader-
ship and challenge Israel’s “Western” identity. Some of them, like the new activist group 
Tor HaZahav, go as far as openly describing Israel as part of the Middle East, although 
without elaborating what that would mean concretely. The paradigm shift associated 
with these developments thus remains an intra-societal phenomenon for the time 
being. Foreign policy implications, for example for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or 
relations with Europe, are not discernible at this stage. 
 
Almost seventy years after the founding 
of the state of Israel, the nation is still em-
broiled in identity-shaping processes. Today 
the Mizrahim play a leading role in these, 
and increasingly set the country’s cultural 
and political agenda. 
The term “Mizrahim” (Hebrew for “East-
erners”) is a modern invention of Israeli 
society. It encompasses all Jews whose ori-
gins lie in the Middle East and North Africa, 
as distinct from the “European” Ashkena-
zim: Jews from the Maghreb as well as Per-
sian, Yemeni and Iraqi Jews. When they 
arrived in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s they 
did not yet represent a monolithic ethnic or 
political formation. In fact, a distinct Miz-
rahi ethno-cultural consciousness only 
emerged in the course of the confrontation 
with Israel’s European-influenced society. 
Multiple Fields of Conflict 
Israel’s Jewish population is roughly half 
Mizrahi and half Ashkenazi (48 percent and 
45 percent respectively), alongside smaller 
groups such as the Ethiopian Jews. For sta-
tistical purposes, the growing numbers of 
Israelis of mixed Mizrahi/Ashkenazi herit-
age are recorded by paternal line. On top 
of the ethnic divide as such, conflicts based 
on socio-economic, cultural and political 
differences exist between the two groups. 
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Socio-economic gap 
Since they arrived in Israel the Mizrahim 
have felt socio-economically disadvantaged 
compared to the Ashkenazim. Israeli soci-
ologists identify three principal factors that 
contributed to this situation: geographical 
remoteness from centres of power, a poor 
economic starting situation and restricted 
access to education. 
The government deliberately settled 
newly arrived Mizrahim in the structurally 
underdeveloped periphery thus laying the 
groundwork for their marginal status. Far 
from the economic, political and cultural 
centre of the Greater Tel Aviv, they found 
themselves excluded from full integration. 
The arrival of the Mizrahim divided the 
Israeli economy into two ethnically defined 
classes. Ashkenazim rose to join the middle 
class, while Mizrahi Jews, who often brought 
craft skills from the more traditional eco-
nomic structures of the Arab states, mostly 
became manual workers. This divided 
labour market was perpetuated by the exist-
ence of two separate state education sys-
tems. Ashkenazim were able to use secular 
schools on the Western model as a spring-
board to higher education, while Mizrahim 
generally took the vocational route.  
Dissatisfaction with their situation led to 
massive protests by the Mizrahim, the best-
known of which are the Wadi Salib riots of 
1959 and the Black Panther protests of 1971. 
In 1997 a group of intellectuals formed 
Hakeshet Hademokratit Hamizrachit (Miz-
rahi Democratic Rainbow Coalition) to 
articulate economic and social demands – 
for example for jobs, housing and educa-
tion – and force politicians to address them. 
The socio-economic divide between 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is less wide in 
the second and third generations than 
in the first. The peripheral transit camps 
have grown into “development towns” with 
proper (albeit improveable) infrastructure 
and better educational opportunities. The 
establishment of a large number of new 
colleges increased the proportion of Miz-
rahim going on to study to 42 percent 
(2002), almost equivalent to their proportion 
of the population as a whole. Even at the 
universities, which are located largely in 
the centre of the country, they represented 
23 percent of students by 2002. 
Although the education gap has nar-
rowed quantitatively, qualitative differences 
persist. Studies show that the institutions 
with the lowest prestige and modest stand-
ards attract the highest proportions of 
Mizrahi students, most of whom still come 
from less-educated milieus. With science 
and high-tech courses largely attended by 
Ashkenazim and the Israeli labour market 
increasingly modern and technological, 
the ethnic gap persists in these areas. 
Nonetheless, since the wave of Russian-
speaking and Ethiopian immigration in 
the 1990s, the Mizrahim have been less 
obviously socio-economically marginalised. 
As the latest arrivals took their place in the 
low-wage sector, a “new Mizrahi middle 
class” emerged. This is reflected in the find-
ings of the Adva Center, which conducts 
research into equality and social justice in 
Israel: In 2015 the pay of “native Israelis 
of Ashkenazi origin” was 31 percent above 
the average, and that of Mizrahi 14 percent 
above average. “Native Israelis from FSU 
countries” (the former Soviet Union) earned 
close to average (1 percent above), followed 
by Arab workers with two-thirds of the aver-
age and last of all Ethiopian Israelis earning 
little more than half the average. 
Cultural rivalries 
The Zionist policy of the equalising “melting 
pot”, as Ben Gurion described Israel, set 
out to create a “new Jew”. Zionism’s goal of 
uniting the Jewish people in their Biblical 
homeland was incompatible with the idea 
of different Jewish identities. So it sub-
sumed them all into the hegemonic 
European Zionist concept of Jewishness and 
left no space for other cultural traditions. 
In the early years, Israeli society rejected 
the tending of such specific cultures as 
“sectoralism”. The dominant Ashkenazi 
elite with its sophisticated, Europeanised 
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culture also viewed Mizrahi culture as 
primitive. 
The Mizrahim arrived in a Western-lean-
ing and anti-Arab Israel. The reasons for 
this are to be found in the anti-Arab stance 
of the currents that dominated politics 
and cultural life and in Israel’s geopolitical 
situation and ongoing conflict with the 
Arab states. In order to gain acceptance in 
Israel, first-generation Mizrahim largely 
avoided displaying their culture in public. 
In fact, many even adopted European-
sounding names in order to avoid appear-
ing “primitive” and to escape suspicions 
of illoyality. And they also sought to avoid 
speaking their own language, usually 
Arabic, and cultivating their traditions 
in fields such as food and music. 
The growing hostility exhibited towards 
Israel by their countries of origin strength-
ened Mizrahi identification with their new 
– and now only – home. This geographical 
proximity to the Arab world and culture 
combined with a simultaneous compulsion 
to reject it publicly placed the Mizrahim 
in a schizophrenic situation. Work on the 
history of the Oriental Jews conducted by 
researchers from the Rainbow Coalition pre-
pared the ground to address this dilemma 
of Mizrahi identity. The second and third 
generations now demanded equality 
between the Oriental Jewish culture and 
the predominant Ashkenazi. 
Political differences 
Mizrahi protests ultimately led to tan-
gible political consequences in 1977, with 
the victory of Likud over the Labour Party 
(HaAvoda) 1977. The historic election 
upset, for which the Hebrew neologism 
“mahapakh” was coined, ended the era of 
Ashkenazi political hegemony. The Labour 
Party, which had consolidated the privi-
leged position of the Ashkenazim, was 
blamed for marginalising the Mizrahim in 
the early decades. The relationship between 
Mizrahi voters and Likud (which has never 
itself in fact been led by Mizrahim), can be 
characterised as paternalistic and clientel-
ist. Its leaders see themselves as the voice 
of the Mizrahim. 
The spectrum of religious parties con-
tains some representing Ashkenazi, and 
others representing Mizrahi interests. Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef, who died in 2013, was spiri-
tual leader of the ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi 
and founded the Shas Party in 1984. 
Although its ideas diverge from those of 
the largely traditionally religious Mizrahi 
voters, Shas has succeeded in corralling the 
Mizrahi electorate by emphasising their 
shared roots. The Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox 
equivalent is United Torah Judaism. Be-
cause Mizrahim tend to vote for religious 
and nationalist parties like Shas and Likud, 
they are attributed firm ideological posi-
tions opposing the secularism and liberal-
ism of left-of-centre parties that tend to be 
supported by Ashkenazi voters. There is 
statistical support for this assertion. 
Accordingly, in the two central issues 
of Israeli politics – the treatment of religion 
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – most 
of the Mizrahim lean towards positions con-
trary to those of the majority of the Ashke-
nazim. In fact, however, it is by no means 
certain that these are entirely substantive 
differences. Many Mizrahim might poten-
tially support more moderate positions 
if they did not associate the left-of-centre 
parties with the Ashkenazi establishment. 
A New Mizrahi Course in 
Culture and Politics 
Since the turn of the century the conflict 
between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim has 
been about more than one ethnic group’s 
advantages over another. Increasingly, it 
also concerns the country’s future self-
image and as such its political leadership 
and positioning as “Western” or “Eastern”. 
The process of “Orientalisation” – or in 
Israeli terms of “Mizrahisation” – is in full 
swing, as manifested in the current identity 
debates and in popular culture. Political 
parties have accommodated the trend by 
gradually granting greater attention to the 
concerns of the Mizrahim. At the same time 
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new Mizrahi organisations and networks are 
emerging, aiming to become the new elite. 
Religious attitudes (2014/2015) 
Mizrahim 
 11% don’t believe in God 
 32% identify as Hiloni (secular) 
 42% identify as Masorti (traditional) 
 18% identify as Dati (religious) 
 8% identify as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) 
 49% believe that religion should be 
separate from government poli-
cies (as do 70% of Ashkenazim) 
 
Ashkenazim 
 35% don’t believe in God 
 66% identify as Hiloni (secular) 
 15% identify as Masorti (traditional) 
 8% identify as Dati (religious) 
 12% identify as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) 
National attitudes (2014/2015) 
55% of Mizrahim say that Jews should 
remain in Israel, even if it means giving 
up the good life 
(as do 39% of Ashkenazim) 
 
56% of Mizrahim say that Israeli Arabs 
should be expelled or transferred from 
Israel  
(as do 40% of Ashkenazim) 
 
48% of Mizrahim say that settlements on 
the West Bank help Israel’s security 
(as do 35 % of Ashkenazim) 
Source: Pew Research Center, Israel’s 
Religiously Divided Society, March 8, 2016,  
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2016/03/ 
Israel-Survey-Full-Report-03-01-
EMBARGO.pdf 
A general “Orientalisation” in society 
A growing societal recognition of Judaism’s 
Oriental cultural and identity-forming attri-
butes can currently be observed. This devel-
opment is associated with an increasingly 
active “new Mizrahim”, who include artists, 
students, journalists and other intellectuals. 
They are leaders of the Mizrahim second 
and third generations, whose socio-eco-
nomic advancement lends them greater 
self-confidence than their parents’ gen-
eration. The proponents of the new Mizrahi 
activism embed their vision of a “Middle 
Eastern” Israeli society in what are often 
traditionalistic and reactionary ideas. 
At the same time, the process of “Orien-
talisation” is also driven – in a different 
context – by the new generation of Ashke-
nazi leftists. They welcome the “rediscov-
ery” of Judaism’s Oriental roots because 
that fits with their ideas of peaceful co-
existence within the Arab region. Young 
Ashkenazim also exhibit solidarity with 
the Mizrahim. The frame of a post-Zionist 
discourse that has jettisoned the idea of 
the melting pot supplies encouragement 
to anything associated with folklore, Jewish 
identities and alternative traditions. Ideo-
logically, this Ashkenazi “Orientalism” 
remains foreign to most Mizrahim, even 
if they undoubtedly benefit from it in the 
sense of a general improvement in their 
situation. 
The most striking manifestations of 
“Orientalisation” can be observed in popu-
lar culture. In recent years Israeli television 
has broadcast three successful series ad-
dressing discrimination and stereotyping 
of the Mizrahim: “Zaguri Imperia” (2014), 
“‘Arsim’ and ‘Frechot’: The New Elites” 
(2014) and “Achlu li, Shatu li: The Next 
Generation” (2016). They raise issues such 
as emulation of Ashkenazim and the pejo-
rative terms used to describe Mizrahim 
(“Ars” and “Frecha” being the male and 
female equivalents of “chav”). Oriental 
music and Mizrahi poetry are also gaining 
in popularity. The Mizrahi poetry group 
“Ars Poetica”, for example, enjoys similar 
fame to popstars. The cultural “Orientalisa-
tion” has reached the Israeli mainstream. 
“Orientalisation” of the political agenda 
The governing coalition of Likud and HaBait 
HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) has added 
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Mizrahi issues to its agenda, instrumental-
ising them for political ends. In June 2016 
Benjamin Netanyahu ordered a new inves-
tigation into the Yemenite Children Affair, 
in which between 1948 and 1954 children 
of Yemeni immigrants are alleged to have 
been kidnapped and adopted by Ashkenazi 
families, often childless Holocaust survivors. 
Mizrahi activists assert that the purpose 
was to “de-Arabise” the “backward” Oriental 
Jews. 
The accusation is directed at the govern-
ment of the time, which was led by the 
traditionally Ashkenazi Labour Party. The 
allegations have been very persistent, and 
form a narrative passed from generation to 
generation within the Yemeni community. 
Whether the new investigation confirms 
that the elites at the time knew what was 
occurring, or like earlier probes fails to do 
so, the discussion does nothing to narrow 
the rift between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim. 
Any proof of an “Ashkenazi conspiracy” 
would devastate an already weak opposi-
tion and drive votes to Likud. 
Culture Minister Miri Regev has launched 
several initiatives to end Ashkenazi hegemo-
ny in the cultural institutions. One means 
to this end is the diversion of state spend-
ing into Mizrahim cultural projects. 
In 2016 Education Minister Naftali 
Bennett established a committee to im-
prove the representation of Oriental Jewish 
culture and history in the education sys-
tem. Chaired by the Mizrahi author Erez 
Biton, the committee proposed for example 
adding texts by Mizrahi intellectuals such 
as Jacques Derrida to the school curriculum 
and organising school trips to Spain and 
Morocco (like those already running to Po-
land). Oriental Jewish school students whose 
ancestors were driven out of Spain to North 
Africa will be given the opportunity to visit 
the historical Jewish sites there. At home, 
the Mizrahi Jews’ history of pogroms and 
expulsions is to be given greater weight in 
the collective consciousness, which has 
until now been defined above all by the suf-
fering of the Ashkenazi Jews. 
New activism: Tor HaZahav – Torenu 
The contemporary Mizrahi protest move-
ment’s desire for a “Mizrahisation” of Israel 
as a whole is illustrated especially clearly 
by the group Tor HaZahav (The Golden Age), 
which formed in early 2016. For the group’s 
supporters and activists Israel is neither a 
European enclave in the Middle East, nor 
“a villa in the jungle”, as Ehud Barak once 
put it. Instead, they see their country as 
an integral part of the region. In their eyes 
Israel stands within the natural continuum 
of the region’s Jewish history. Referencing 
the legendary medieval Jewish flourishing 
on the Iberian peninsula, when Jews and 
Arabs coexisted in prosperity, they seek to 
ring in a new “Golden Age”. 
Their assertion that their Zionism is “not 
only the Zionism of the kibbutzim and the 
Palmach” refers to the elitism shared by 
the “socialist islands” in the desert and the 
paramilitary fighting force. Both were his-
torical manifestations of the European 
Jewish vision of Israel. “The Zionism of Tor 
HaZahav is the Zionism of Mizrahi factory 
and construction workers, whose hands 
created Israel’s cities, its prosperity, and its 
authentic Israeli culture.” This statement 
refers to Mizrahi marginalisation in the 
labour market and the settlement of Miz-
rahi Jews in the periphery. Tor HaZahav 
understands “authentic culture” as the 
region’s Oriental culture, in contrast to 
the imported and seemingly artificial 
European culture. 
About sixty activists form the core of Tor 
HaZahav. Many of them are already well-
known as artists or leaders of other Mizrahi 
protest movements. Although they come 
from the new Mizrahi middle class, they seek 
to reach marginalised groups by stressing 
their Mizrahi identity. The group’s website 
lists a series of demands addressed to Israeli 
politics and society: improving living con-
ditions in the periphery in the interests of 
equality, full participation in official status 
markers (Mizrahim on banknotes, in street 
names and as recipients of official awards), 
and satisfactory resolution of the Yemenite 
Children Affair. But the most striking de-
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mand is for the immediate “integration 
of Israel in the Middle East”, by nurturing 
Oriental history, language, tradition and 
culture. 
The activists from Tor HaZahav see a con-
nection between the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi 
constellation within Israel and Israel’s con-
flict with its neighbours. They believe that 
the road to peace and normalisation will be 
smoother once Israel has recognised itself 
as part of the Middle East and established 
a traditional – Oriental-rooted – political 
elite. The suffix “Torenu” in the movement’s 
name (Hebrew for “our turn now”) repre-
sents a challenge to the Ashkenazi elites. 
So on the one side the activists are push-
ing for equality in a hierarchical Ashkenazi-
dominated society and see themselves enter-
ing the ranks of the decision-makers. On 
the other, they want to demonstrate that 
the rich history of Mizrahi culture and 
ideas possesses the potential to create a new 
ideological foundation for Israeli society. 
However, the rudimentary nature of their 
political ideas creates an impression that 
Tor HaZahav is in fact simply riding on a 
wave of broader social change. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
The “Orientalisation” or “Mizrahisation” 
of Israeli society is a long-term trend, which 
has been driven by waves of Mizrahi protest 
and finally consolidated in recent years. The 
paradigm shift – turning away from a West-
ern orientation and towards Oriental origins 
– can be recognised in four political fields: 
Society: The Mizrahim’s transformation 
from marginalised group to central politi-
cal force has brought with it a substantial 
expansion of their influence. Today they 
hold the upper hand over the Ashkenazim, 
as the determining factor for Israel’s iden-
tity and cultural alignment. Mizrahim have 
thus come to dominate the gradual process 
of consolidating an overall Israeli identity. 
Their active participation in this process 
is conditioned not least by their stronger 
ties to the state of Israel, which is their only 
possible homeland. For Israelis of European 
origin, who are often also citizens of a 
Western state and maintain a transnational 
ethos through socialisation and education, 
the bond with Israel is less tight and less 
exclusive. Consequently it is Mizrahim who 
today define Israeliness and consciously 
and unconsciously invest more in the new 
Israeli identity. 
Social tensions continue to exist between 
the two groups. In particular Ashkenazim 
draw accusations of intra-Jewish racism 
when they criticise the rise of the Mizrahi. 
So instead they do so indirectly, scape-
goating the Mizrahim for all the defects of 
Israeli society. Mizrahim in turn complain 
that they still experience structural dis-
crimination. 
Both these perspectives were on display 
in the debate over the manslaughter pros-
ecution of Elor Azaria, who shot and killed 
a Palestinian assailant – lying motionless 
on the ground – in March 2016 in Hebron. 
Ashkenazi journalists saw the incident as a 
“typical” case of Mizrahi violence and bru-
tality, while Mizrahi reporters accused the 
Ashkenazi judiciary and generals of con-
ducting a witchhunt against a member of 
the Mizrahi group. Mizrahim and Ashkena-
zim do not find it easy to argue construc-
tively. At the same time, the incident has 
made anti-Ashkenazi rhetoric acceptable 
among Mizrahi activists. 
Party politics: The run-up to the next elec-
tions is highly likely to reveal and reflect 
the growing significance of the Mizrahim. 
Left-wing parties can also be expected to 
give list places to candidates with Mizrahi 
roots and to take up their socio-economic 
and cultural concerns. In the longer term 
the “Mizrahisation” of party politics could 
endanger the monopoly Shas currently holds 
over ethnic representation. With the Mizra-
him demonstrating a new, strengthened self-
confidence, the image of the Mizrahi under-
dog is no longer a decisive reason to vote 
for a particular political party. 
Tor HaZahav has not yet the potential 
to become a political party before the next 
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elections, but its representatives could al-
ternatively stand as candidates for existing 
parties. Because the group has to date only 
spoken concretely about domestic politics 
it can currently – in the tradition of “Israeli 
escapism” – be placed in the centre ground. 
As such, it would join Yesh Atid and Kulanu 
in avoiding the Middle East conflict in order 
to attract voters in the centre ground who 
are tired of the problem. In so doing, Tor 
HaZahav would still be leaving most of the 
Mizrahi voters – who traditionally vote for 
security – to Likud. This would exacerbate 
the fragmentation of the centre and attract 
more votes from the left than the right. 
Middle East conflict: The Mizrahim/Ashkena-
zim constellation has not to date had any 
identifiable effects on the Middle East con-
flict, despite its instrumentalisation in 
domestic power struggles. Ophir Toubul, 
driving force behind Tor HaZahav, explic-
itly blames the “white, left-wing Ashkena-
zim” for the failure of the peace process. By 
adopting the position of the “outsider” in 
the Middle East, as secular Europeans in the 
Levant, he says, they drove a wedge between 
Mizrahim and Arab. In fact, he argues, the 
two groups should actually understand 
each other on the basis of their shared 
spirituality and holy sites. These statements 
reflect a widespread Mizrahi belief that the 
Ashkenazi elites are to blame for the 
expulsion of the Palestinians, the wars, the 
occupation and the stagnation of the peace 
process. 
However, although the “new Mizrahim” 
present themselves as the better mediators 
of the Middle East conflict and emphasise 
the roots they share with the Arabs, they 
have to date concentrated exclusively on 
consolidating their own position in Israeli 
society and on its “Mizrahisation”. The 
identity discourse thus offers a population 
weary of conflict a platform to discuss the 
“Arab” within Judaism, but without forcing 
them to interact with their immediate Pales-
tinian neighbours – nor with the Arab citi-
zens of Israel itself. At the same time there 
is no sign of Palestinian leaders preferring 
Mizrahi partners over Askenazi. Israel’s 
“Orientalisation” or “Mizrahisation” thus 
has no discernible effect on the Middle East 
conflict, but serves the Mizrahim as a point 
of reference for domestic political battles. 
Relations with Europe: To date there is no 
indication of the “Mizrahisation” of Israel’s 
political elites interfering with Israeli-Euro-
pean relations. Even in the past, European 
cultural identification with the Ashkenazi 
leadership was no guarantee of political 
consensus. Emphasis on shared values has 
generally been more important for Euro-
pean decision-makers than for their Israeli 
counterparts. For the latter, relations with 
Europe have generally been interest-driven. 
Here the domestic Israeli paradigm shift is 
unlikely to cause much change. Economic 
relations – where Europe is Israel’s most 
important trading partner – and security 
cooperation will continue to define the 
relationship. 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
has recently spoken of a turn towards Arab 
neighbours seeking large-scale regional 
cooperation. European decision-makers 
should not misinterpret such statements 
as manifestations of domestic “Orientalisa-
tion”, but treat them as realpolitik. 
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